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Abstract
Reliability (survival analysis, to biostatisticians) is a key ingredient for mak-
ing decisions that mitigate the risk of failure. The other key ingredient is utility.
A decision theoretic framework harnesses the two, but to invoke this framework
we must distinguish between chance and probability. We describe a functional
form for the utility of chance that incorporates all dispositions to risk, and pro-
pose a probability of choice model for eliciting this utility. To implement the
model a subject is asked to make a series of binary choices between gambles and
certainty. These choices endow a statistical character to the problem of utility
elicitation. The workings of our approach are illustrated via a live example in-
volving a military planner. The material is general because it is germane to any
situation involving the valuation of chance.
Key Words: Choice Models, Decision Making, Probability, Propensity,
Quality of Life, Risk Analysis.
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1 Introduction and Overview
1.1 Preamble: Motivation and Objectives
Perhaps a better title for this paper could be ”The Utility of Chance”, but it would
detract from its motivating import, which is applied and pragmatic. Indeed, the work
here was suggested by a scenario wherein the author was asked to determine if the
reliability of an amphibious landing tank, called the ”Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle”
was in excess of .999, a number sacrosanct to a commanding general of the U.S. Marine
Corps. By reliability, we mean the survival function evaluated at any specified time,
called the ”mission time”. Given the vehicle’s architecture, the said number was
literally impossible to achieve. Thus arose the question of why .999? It turned out, as
is usual the case with reliability specifications, that such numbers are arbitrary, more
a matter of decree than a consideration of need. See, for example, The Washington
Post, February 2, 2008 article on ”GAO Report Criticizes Defense on its Acquisition of
Weapons”. A more recent, albeit related, case in point is the U. S. Air Force’s decision
to opt for the oversized and cost-ineffective KC-30 tanker over the right-sized and less
costly KC-767 tanker [cf. Washington Post, June 11, 2008, p. A16]. It is possible that
similar situations may also prevail in the biomedical environment wherein choices that
impact patient survival over cost and quality of life considerations, are not judiciously
balanced.
There are two aims that underlie this paper. The first is to advocate the need for
utility considerations in the reliability arena including a suggestion for its general shape.
The second is to propose a statistical approach based on the item response theory mod-
els (also known as a choice models) for eliciting an individual’s utility. However, to
set a formal stage for achieving the first aim, we need to distinguish between reliability
(or the survival function) as an unknown chance or propensity , and survivability
as ones subjective (personal) probability about the unknown chance. By propensity we
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mean the purported causes of observed stable relative frequencies; see Popper (1957).
Propensities are invoked to explain why repeating a certain kind of experiment will
generate a given outcome type at a persistent rate; they are constrained to be between
0 and 1, both inclusive. Regarding the second aim, statistical methods for eliciting
utilities are virtually non-existent, and regrettably so, because such methodologies can
vastly enhance the utility assessment enterprise. Some exceptions are the papers of
Mosteller and Nogee (1951), Becker, De Groot and Marschak (1964), and Novick and
Lindley (1979).
Stripped of the reliability centered application that has motivated our work, the
underlying theme of this paper should have a wider appeal. It is germane to any
situation that entails the desirability of a chance. For example, how much more
desirable is a coin with a propensity of heads of say .95 to a coin whose propensity of
heads is .93, given that the coins are to be used for gambling? Similarly, how much
more desirable is a pill with a cure rate of .98 to one with a cure rate of .95, given that
the former could cost much more than the latter? To address issues such as these we
need to assess the utility of propensity. But first in order are some comments on the
roles of reliability and survival analysis in risk management, the roles of probability
and utility decision in making, and the structure of a decision problem. Sections 1.2
through 1.4 are devoted to these topics. Section 1.5 is a summary presentation of de
Finetti’s (1972) theorem on infinite exchangeable Bernoulli sequences, and how this
theorem may provide a hook on which the essence of the material here can be thought
of. The rest of this paper, Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5, pertains to the utility of reliability,
a model for eliciting utilities, deploying the model, and a live application, respectively.
Section 6 closes this paper. It may be of relevance to note that the matter of a utility
of chance is to be contrasted with that of the utility of probability for which there is a
precedence in the works of Lindley (1976), and Good and Card (1971).
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1.2 Reliability and Survival Analysis in Risk Management
Reliability (Survival) analyses done by engineers (biostatisticians) provide yardsticks
for quantifying the random nature of lifetimes. We quantify this randomness for man-
aging the risk of failure. Managing risk means making choices that minimize the losses
caused by adverse events. In the context of engineering, such choices pertain to de-
ciding between competing designs, managing maintenance, or the acceptance/rejection
of manufactured lots. In biomedicine, decision making pertains to treatment options,
and other choices that impact survival and the quality of life.
1.3 Coherent Decision Making: Probability and Utility
Coherent decision making rests on two pillars, probability and utility, and the principle
of maximization of expected utility (MEU). Probability quantifies uncertainty and
utility quantifies preferences. Utility in statistical inference is via loss functions, such
as squared error, absolute error, linex, etc.. Such loss functions are stylized. There
appears to be a dearth of literature in statistical outlets about eliciting the actual loss
functions of decision makers. This state of affairs is also true in the engineering sciences
such as filtering, control, and information fusion, wherein a use of squared-error loss
functions seems to be the norm.
1.4 The Structure of a Decision Problem
Suppose that a decision maker D is required to choose one among a set of n mutually
exclusive and exhaustive actions, a1, a2,..., an. Associated with ai, are ki outcomes
(states of nature) θij , j = 1, ..., ki, assumed mutually exclusive and exhaustive. When
D chooses ai, D is uncertain about the outcome. Let P(θij) be D’s probability of
occurrence of θij , i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., ki; P(θij) is personal to D. Let U(θij) be D’s
utility of θij; U(θij) is also personal to D. U(•) is a numerical quantity between 0 and
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1, and if U(θij) > U(θim), j 6= m, then D prefers θij to θim. We assume that all the
θij ’s can be preference ranked by D (i.e. D satisfies the axiom of completeness).
The focus of this paper is to develop a procedure for obtaining U(θij), in a manner
that ensures a certain kind of consistency; this will be clarified later in Section 4.1.
The expected utility of ai is,
E[U(ai)] =
∑
j
U(θij)P(θij)
and the MEU principle prescribes that D choose that ai for which E[U(ai)] is a max-
imum. In developing an argument for this principle D assumes that there exists a
θij , say θ
∗ for which U(θ∗) = 1, and some other θij , say θ∗ for which U(θ∗) = 0. The
θ∗ and θ∗ are known as anchor points . In our particular application the θij are
propensities; thus θij ∈ [0, 1], with anchor points U(0) = 0, and U(1) = 1.
To harness the notions of reliability and survival analysis for risk management, we
need to cast them in the decision making framework described above. One approach to
doing so is motivated by de Finetti’s Theorem (1972) on exchangeable sequences. The
theorem leads to the view that the reliability and the survival function are a chance
(or a propensity), and not a probability. By contrast, Kolmogorov (1969) does not
distinguish between chance and probability, so that to him reliability is a probability.
It is not clear as to how under this conventional view of Kolmogorov, reliability and
survival functions can be formally cast in a decision theoretic framework.
1.5 de Finetti’s Theorem: Infinite Exchangeable Sequences
Let X1, X2, ..., be an infinite sequence of (non-negative) continuous random variables
with the property that for some θ and all i
P(Xi ≥ x|θ) = F (x|θ), x ≥ 0.
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Then for every finite n ≥ 1,
P(X1 ≥ x1, ..., Xn ≥ xn) =
∞∫
0
n∏
1
F (xi|θ)Π(θ)dθ,
where Π(θ) encapsulates D’s uncertainty about θ. Thus for n = 1
P(X ≥ x) =
∞∫
0
F (x|θ)Π(θ)dθ; (1.1)
F (x|θ) is the reliability (or the survival function) of X , and is likened to chance; see
Lindley and Phillips (1976), or Lindley and Singpurwalla (2002). The quantity P(X ≥
x) is D’s uncertainty about the event (X ≥ x) described via a personal probability. We
label it as the survivability of X , and is distinguished from the survival function
P(X ≥ x|θ). In a decision theoretic set-up, P(X ≥ x|θ) = F (x|θ) ∈ [0, 1] is the
unknown state of nature, and Π(θ) encapsulates D’s uncertainty about it.
The goal of this paper is to assess the utility of F (x|θ), for fixed x ≥ 0.
2 The Utility of Reliability / The Survival Function
Let U [F (x|θ)] denote D’s utility of F (x|θ). With F (x|θ) ∈ [0, 1], we anchor on two
points F (x|θ) = 1 and F (x|θ) = 0, setting U(1) = 1 and U(0) = 0, and ask what is
U(F (x|θ)) for any F (x|θ) ∈ (0, 1)?
To address this question, we offer D the following two choices:
i) Receive F (x|θ) for sure, or
ii) Agree to a gamble wherein D receives F (x|θ) = 1 with chance p, and
F (x|θ) = 0 with chance (1− p).
Then, D’s utility of F (x|θ) is that value of p for which D is indifferent between the
two choices of certainty versus uncertainty -henceforth a p-gamble. With U [F (x|θ)]
so anchored archetypal utility functions can be prescribed by the relationship U [F (x|θ)] =
6
(F (x|θ))
β
x , for β > 0; see Figure 2.1. Note that D is risk neutral for β = x, and risk
prone (averse) for β > (<) x.
Figure 2.1: Archetypal Forms of D’s Utility of F (x|θ).
It can be so that D is risk prone for small values of F (x|θ) and risk averse for large
values of F (x|θ) making the utility function S-shaped; similarly, a reverse S-shape,
mutatis-mutandis.
2.1 Eliciting Utility: Some Caveats.
For convenience set F (x|θ) = c, for c ∈ (0, 1). Recall that U(c) is that chance, say p∗,
at which D is indifferent between receiving a c for sure, versus a p∗-gamble.
The conventional approach for eliciting p∗, revolves around two methods, fixed
probability , and fixed state [cf. Hull, Moore, and Thomas (1973), or Farquhar
(1984)]. In the former, D is presented with a p∗-gamble, and is asked to choose a
c ∈ (0, 1) for which D is indifferent between c and the p∗-gamble. The c so chosen is
called the certainty equivalent of the gamble. This exercise is repeated for a range
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of values of p∗ ∈ (0, 1). In the fixed state method, c is fixed and D is interrogated
over a range of values of p until D converges on a p∗ for which D is indifferent between
receiving the fixed c and a p∗-gamble. Either method is cumbersome because it is
difficult to iterate around an indifference value of c or p. However, for any fixed p,
it may be easier for D to make a binary choice between receiving a sure c versus a
p-gamble. Indeed, this is the essence of our proposed choice model based approach for
eliciting utility; this approach is discussed in Sections 3.
In addition to the elicitation difficulty mentioned above, there are two other issues
associated with the conventional approach. For one, there is no assurance that D will
be consistent in the declared values of p. Specifically, the p’s should be non-decreasing
in F (x|θ) -themonotonicity requirement- and they must be invariant with respect
to the anchor points used to elicit them -the invariance requirement . Attempts
at resolving this latter type of inconsistency have entailed a use of linear programming
and regression based approaches [cf. Meyer and Pratt (1968), and Novick and Lindley
(1979), respectively].
Another feature of the conventional approach is that it being fundamentally deter-
ministic and iterative, there is no provision for accommodating D’s lack of definitiveness
about the declared values. By contrast, a Bayesian procedure based on binary choices
will have a built in mechanism for the treatment of D’s uncertainties.
Finally, there is a price to be paid for achieving a high reliability and the survival
probability. This tantamounts to a disutility . The matter of disutilities associated
with high survival probabilities, has spawned the topic of ”quality of life” in the
health sciences, [cf. Mesbah and Singpurwalla (2008)].
8
2.2 Incorporating Disutility: An Omnibus Utility.
For purposes of illustration, an archetypal function that is able to reflect the feature
that an increase in reliability should be accompanied by an increase in cost, so that
the disutility due to cost is an increasing function of reliability, can be of the form
1− exp
(
−
δF (x|θ)
1− F (x|θ)
)
, (2.1)
for some δ > 0.
Combining this disutility with the utility, yields an omnibus utility for reliability
(or survival) as:
(F (x|θ))
β
x −
[
1− exp
(
−
δF (x|θ)
1− F (x|θ)
)]
, (2.2)
for x ≥ 0, β, δ > 0, and F (x|θ) ∈ [0, 1]. Like Equation (2.1), Equation (2.2) is also
illustrative.
3 A Probability of Choice Model for Utility Elicitation
The thesis that it is easier for D to make a binary choice between the options of
receiving an F (x|θ) ∈ (0, 1) for sure, or receiving F (x|θ) = 1(0) with chance p(1− p),
versus arriving upon a p by iteration motivates us to consider Probability of Choice
Models as a possible mechanism for eliciting utilities. In Section 3.1 we motivate and
introduce our model. A use of this model entails fixing c at some ci, and p at pij ,
and then asking D to make a binary choice between a sure ci versus a pij-gamble, for
j = 1, 2, ..., ni. We set Yij = 1(0) if D opts (does not opt) for the gamble. We repeat
this exercise for different values of ci, i = 1, 2, ..., ni. Using the Yij as data, we estimate
the model parameters, and for every c, find that p for which the probability of choosing
the p-gamble is 0.5. This binary choice strategy resonates with the method used by
Mosteller and Nogee (1951) who consider the proportion of times a subject chooses the
various gambles.
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3.1 The Proposed Model for Utility Elicitation
The proposed model is based on how hard or easy it is for D to make the binary choices.
Given below are the boundary conditions for a rational D:
• When p = 1, D will choose Y = 1 for all c < 1;
• When p = 0, D will choose Y = 0 for all c > 0;
• When p = c, a risk neutral D will choose Y = 1 or Y = 0, equally often; by
contrast, a risk prone (averse) D will choose Y = 1 more (less) often than Y = 0.
Let P(Y = 1) = Π denote an elicitor E ’s personal probability of D choosing a p-
gamble over the certain c. Note that there are two kinds of entities that come into
play; E ’s personal probability Π, and a chance p. D’s indifference between the two
choices tantamounts to Π = 1
2
. D’s choices are the easiest with E ’s Π = 1, when c
and p lie on the lines joining (c = 0, p = 0), (0, 1], and (1, 1) and with Π = 0, when
they lie on the lines joining (0, 0), (1, 0] and (1, 1). These are the boundaries of Figure
3.1. D’s choices become difficult as p and c get close to each other, becoming the most
difficult when c = p. The roles of p and c are analogous to those of the ability and the
difficulty parameters in the Rasch Model used in education testing and quality of life
studies [cf. Mesbah, Cole and Lee (2002)].
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Figure 3.1: Boundary Conditions for a Risk Neutral D
The boundary conditions of Figure 3.1 motivate the general forms of Figure 3.2 as
E ’s model for Π, seen as a function of (p− c).
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Figure 3.2: General Forms for E ’s Model for Π.
For a risk neutral D, the right diagonal line of Figure 3.2 would encapsulate E ’s
choice probabilities, whereas the concave (convex) curve would encapsulate these prob-
abilities for a risk prone (averse) D. The above relationships between (p − c) and Π
can, for p, c 6= 0, 1, be encapsulated via the equation
Π = P(Y = 1|β; c, p) =
(
(p− c) + 1
2
)β
. (3.1)
The inclusion of an additional parameter α > 0 enables us to incorporate varying
degrees of risk aversion and proneness; see Figures 3.3 a) and b). Thus a penultimate
version of the model is
Π = P(Y = 1|α, β; c, p) =
(
(p− c)α + 1
2
)β
. (3.2)
Figure 3.3 a) pertains to the case of α = 1
3
with β = 1
2
, 1, and 2 respectively, and
Figure 3.3 b) is for α = 3 with similar values for β.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of D’s Probability of Choice.
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Whereas Equation (3.2) is intuitively appealing, it suffers from a technical deficiency
which arises when we wish to solve for (p− c) with Π set at 0.5. Specifically, to avoid
complex roots, only certain combinations of values of α and β are admissible. Thus as
a refinement of Equation (3.2), the final version of our model for E ’s choice probability
is:
P(Y = 1|α, β; c, p) =

0, if p = 1 and c < 1, or p > 1 and c = 0;
1
2
, if p = 0 and c = 0, or p = 1 and c = 1;
1, if p = 0 and c > 0, or p < 1 and c = 1;
1
2
[1 + sgn(p− c)|p− c|α]β , otherwise,
(3.3)
where sgn(z) = −1(+1)[0], when z < (>)[=]0, and α, β > 0.
4 Implementing the Model
For any fixed c, our aim is to find that (p − c) for which P(Y = 1|α, β; c, p) = 1
2
; we
can then solve for p, D’s p-gamble, for the fixed c. To do the above we need estimates
of D’s values of α and β for the chosen c. This can be done using the Yij’s declared by
D, for c fixed at ci, and a range of values of p, say pij, j = 1, ..., ni.
In actual practice the values chosen for ci and pij will not involve the boundary
conditions since there is no need to elicit preferences for such clear cut situations. For
purposes of discussion, suppose that the data Yij, j = 1, ..., ni, yield α̂i and β̂i as the
maximum likelihood estimators of α and β, respectively; see Appendix A. Then, the
desired (pi−ci)
def
= ωi, which is a solution to the relationship P(Yi = 1|α̂i, β̂i; ci, pi) =
1
2
,
will be of the form:
ω̂i = sgn(β̂i − 1)
[
sgn(β̂i − 1)(2
1−
1
bβi − 1)
] 1
bαi
; (4.1)
also, ω̂i ∈ [−1,+1].
Consequently, with utilities being constrained to lie between 0 and 1, D’s utility for
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ci will be:
U(ci) =

min(1, ci + ω̂i), if ω̂i > 0,
max(0, ci + ω̂i), if ω̂i < 0,
ci, if ω̂i = 0.
(4.2)
When ω̂i < (>)[=]0, D is risk prone (averse) [neutral] for ci. The above exercise is
repeated for a range of values of c, say c1, ..., ci, ..., cn, to yield D’s utility for survival
as U(c1), ..., U(cn), as perceived by E .
4.1 Adjacent Point Gambles and Coherence
The elicitation of D’s Yij’s discussed in Section 3.2 presumes end point gambles ; i.e.
D receives either a sure ci, or a 1 with chance pij and a 0 with chance (1 − pij). A
problematic feature of these end point gambles is that the resulting utilities may not
be increasing (non-decreasing) in ci. This obstacle can be tempered by considering
adjacent point gambles. That is, D is offered a choice between a sure ci and a pij
gamble involving U(ci−1) and U(ci+1), with U(c0) = U(0) = 1, and U(cn+1) = U(1) =
1, i = 1, ..., n.
The adjacent gamble process can start-off with some ci and an end point gamble to
obtain a U(ci). This is followed by picking a ck between ci and 1 (or between 0 and
ci) to obtain a U(ck) via a pkj-gamble involving U(ci) and 1 (or involving 0 and U(ci)).
Once U(ci) and U(ck) are at hand, these can be used to obtain U(cm) for ci < cm < ck
via a sure cm versus a pmj-gamble.
The adjacent gamble approach will help achieve the monotonicity requirement of the
utility function but will not guarantee it. This is because of the inherent randomness
in the proposed approach which is based on estimating α and β. For a cm ∈ (ci, ck) ,
should U(cm) be greater (less) than ck (ci), then a way to achieve monotonicity would
be to let U(cm) lie on the line segment joining U(ci) and U(ck). A strategy such as this
is used in isotonic regression [see, for example, Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner,
and Brunk (1972)].
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The matter of resolving inconsistencies caused by the failure of invariance is more
difficult to deal with. Novick and Lindley (1979) propose elicitation based on all
possible triplets of the form 0 ≤ i < m < k ≤ 1, each triplet entailing a gamble, which
we denote as a pimk-gamble. A least-squares analysis involving the minimization of
the U(•)’s with respect to log-odds of the type∑
i,m,k
[log(pimk/1− pimk)− log(U(cm)− U(ci)/U(ck)− U(cm))]
2
is then performed; this results in a utility function U(cm). Some discussion on an
approach such as this is in Becker, De Groot and Marschak (1963).
4.2 The Incorporation of Uncertainties: A Bayesian Ap-
proach
Philosophical considerations aside, an approach based on the maximum likelihood es-
timators α̂ and β̂ suffers from the drawback that exact measures of uncertainty about
the inferred utility function U(•) are difficult to obtain. This is so even at the level
of pointwise confidence limits for the U(ci)’s, i = 1, ..., n. On the other hand, a para-
metric Bayesian approach is able to account for the underlying uncertainties by the
process of averaging out with respect to the posterior distributions of α and β. To
see how, suppose that Π(αi, βi) denotes the joint prior distribution on αi and βi, for
i = 1, ..., n; a specific case is described in Section A.1 of Appendix A. For any fixed
ci and data Yij, j = 1, ..., ni, the above prior will lead to a posterior distribution of αi
and βi, say Π(αi, βi; •). Then ω˜i, a Bayes assessment of ωi = (pi − ci), would be the
solution of ∫
αi
∫
βi
[(
1 + sgn(ωi)|ωi|
αi
2
)βi
−
1
2
]
Π(αi, βi; •)dαidβi = 0. (4.3)
With ω˜i, i = 1, ..., n at hand, we may obtain the U(ci), i = 1, ..., n, by mimicking
the procedure outlined before the ω̂i obtained via the method of maximum likelihood.
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5 Application: The Utility of a Vehicle’s Reliability
The following real life example pertains to assessing the utility of reliability of a yet to
be designed manned ground combat vehicle, as perceived by D, a military analyst. D
is also an officer in uniform (retired) and is thus knowledgeable about strategic needs.
Furthermore, D is a well trained operations research analyst exposed to analytical
thinking and decision making. Knowing the utility of reliability (for a mission time
that is specified by D) will help the government procurers specify the vehicle’s design
reliability. The vehicle in question belongs to the family of systems called ”Future
Combat Systems”. There are several hundred such new vehicles that are to be com-
missioned in a brigade, each costing several hundred thousand U.S. dollars. We assume
exchangeability of all the new vehicles in the brigade. The reliabilities of interest to
D are in the range of 0.5 to 0.9, the lower reliabilities of no value, and the higher reli-
abilities deemed unnecessary. Because of security classification, no additional details
can be made available.
Elicitations from D entail both end point gambles and adjacent point gambles. Here
ci takes values .5, .6, .7, .8 and .9, for i = 1, ..., 5 respectively. The values chosen for the
pij ’s are .3, .4, .5, .6, .7, .8, .9 and .95, for j = 1, ..., 8, respectively, in the case of the
end point gambles, and .3, .4, .45, .5, .55, .6, and .7, for the adjacent point gambles.
The gamble probabilities pij were chosen to ensure that neither the gamble nor the
sure thing would always be preferred for any of the reliabilities.
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Table 5.1: D’s Choices Under End Point Gambles.
Table 5.1 shows the results of the elicitation for the end point gambles, and Table
5.2 for the adjacent point gambles. The entries in these tables gives the values Yij,
with Yij = 1, whenever D opts for the gamble. D’s choices are solely based on strategic
needs, not costs.
An inspection of the entries in Table 5.1 suggests that D tends to be risk averse,
because D opts for the pij - gamble only when pij ≥ ci. The entries of Table 5.1
when used to obtain the U(ci)’s via the method of maximum likelihood and also the
Bayesian approach (using the independent gamma priors described in Section A.1 of
Appendix ) yields results that are almost identical; specifically U(.5) = .5, U(.6) = .6,
U(.7) = .7, U(.8) = .93, U(.9) = .92. Figure 5.1 shows a plot of the U(ci)’s versus ci,
i = 1, ..., 5.
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Figure 5.1: D’s Utility of Reliability Based on End Point Gambles (MLE and Bayes).
Figure 5.1 suggests that D’s utility, based on end point gambles, is linear in ci, save
for an upward jump at .8 followed by a slight drop of .01 at .9. This suggests that D
is risk neutral for values of reliability up to .7 and is risk averse for values of reliabil-
ity greater than .7. The drop in utility at .9 is an aberration that, hopefully, can be
avoided by using adjacent point gambles. The essence of the message of Figure 5.1 is
that there does not appear to be any gain in utility in going from a reliability of .8 to
a reliability of .9. Thus to this D, the strategic worthiness of the vehicle matures at a
reliability of about .8; higher reliabilities are of little strategic consequence. A similar
conclusion seems to be true with a consideration of adjacent point gambles, the data
for which are given in Table 5.2 below.
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Table 5.2: D’s Choices Under Adjacent Point Gambles.
An examination of the entries in Table 5.2 suggests that under adjacent point gam-
bles, D tends to be risk prone in disposition towards the vehicle reliability for the values
ci considered here. D’s shift from the risk aversion phenomenon of the entries of table
5.1 to the proneness phenomenon of Table 5.2 is intriguing. It could be attributed to
the feature that it may be easier for D to contemplate end point gambles than adjacent
point gambles.
Table 5.3: D’s Utility of Reliability Based on Adjacent Point Gambles.
The data of Table 5.2 was used to obtain D’s utility of reliability via both the
method of maximum likelihood and the Bayesian approach (described in Section A.1
19
(involving independent gamma priors). Table 5.3 shows the results. Plots of the U(ci)
versus ci obtained via the two methods are shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: A Plot of D’s Utility of Reliability Based on Adjacent Point Gambles.
The plots of Figure 5.2 suggests that for the priors chosen, the method of maximum
likelihood yields uniformly higher values for the utility function than those yielded by
the Bayesian approach, at least for the chosen priors. The differences however, are
not substantial, and especially so, considering the fact that the Bayesian approach has
a built in mechanism for incorporating the underlying uncertainties. Even though the
raw entries of Table 5.2 suggest that D appears to be risk prone, the S-shaped nature of
the plots of Figure 5.2 suggests that D tends to be risk neutral. The disparity between
the intuitive conclusions that are formed by an inspection of the raw data, and those
revealed by a formal analysis of these data is due to the smoothing of the data and the
20
consistency that is enforced by the model of Equations (3.3) and (4.2).
Finally, the likes of Figure 5.2 suggest that there is little by the way of utility for
reliabilities .5 or below, and that there is not much, if any, to be gained in going from
a reliability of .8 to .9, at least under a Bayesian approach. Thus the need to push
for reliability numbers such as .999 that General Officers usually tend to demand is
unwarranted. Whereas we have not performed a reliability analysis of the vehicle in
question, we have been told by D that the new vehicle reliability specifications tend to
be in the form of 0 failures in 1000 operational hours, a requirement that is ”fanciful
and without connection to the real world”.
6 Summary and Conclusions.
In this paper, we have advocated the point of view that a purpose for assessing the
reliability and the survival functions is to help make decisions that mitigate risk. We
have then cast the matter in a decision theoretic framework by leaning on a distinction
between chance and probability. This has then been followed by proposing a general
architecture for the utility of chance or reliability, including some boundary conditions.
We have then proposed a statistical approach for assessing utilities based on binary
choices between gambles and certainties. To facilitate this approach we have proposed
a new choice (or item response theory) model that has features which parallel the
Rasch Model in the sense that both models are indexed by a difference − in our
case (p − c). Here, this difference is germane because the ease with which D can
make a choice depends on the closeness of c and p. The Grade of Membership Model
(GOM), discussed by Ershova, Fienberg and Joutard (2007), encompass aspects of the
Rasch Model [cf. Ershova (2005)], and offers prospects for developing utility elicitation
models more sophisticated than ours. The GOM model is difficult to appreciate and
will require much thought to put it to work. Even though the material of Section 3 on
using a Choice Model for utility elicitation is focused on the utility of reliability, the
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ideas therein are general enough for eliciting utilities in contexts that go beyond the
special case of reliability.
There is much literature on utility theory and utility elicitation by economists, deci-
sion theorists, game theorists, mathematicians and statisticians. The names associated
with these literatures are distinguished. Whereas we have endeavoured to gain an ap-
preciation of as much of these works as is possible, it is likely that we may have missed
some contributions that make our approach and our model for utility elicitation not
new. But assuming that the above is not true, the work described here may open up
avenues for future investigations.
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Appendix A
A.1 The Likelihood Function and Maximum Likelihood
With respect to the notation of Section 3.1, with c fixed at ci, and p at pij, the likelihood
of αi and βi given the data yij, j = 1, ..., ni, with yij = 1 or 0, is of the form:
ni∏
j=1
(
1
2
[1 + sgn(pij − ci)|pij − ci|
αi]
)βiyij (
1−
(
1
2
[1 + sgn(pij − ci)|pij − ci|
αi ]
)βi)1−yij
.
(A.1)
In writing out the above, we assume that given αi and βi, D’s choices for the Yij’s,
j = 1, ..., ni are independent over the pij ’s. This tantamounts to assuming that in
making a choice yij, D forgets his (her) previous choices yik, k = j − 1, j − 2, ..., 2, 1.
One way to achieve this independence would be to select the pij in a random order with
respect to the j’s. By avoiding choosing ci = 1 or 0, and pij = 1 or 0, in the elicitation
process, we can ensure that the likelihood will not involve the boundary conditions of
Figure 3.2. Equation (A.1) can be maximized numerically to yield α̂i and β̂i as the
maximum likelihood estimators of αi and βi, respectively.
A.2 Bayes Inference for α and β
An examination of Figure 3.4 shows that a large value of α causes Π to be steeper for
(p − c) in the vicinity of −1 or +1, and flatter for (p − c) close to zero, than a small
value of α. This type of change characterizes a D who switches slowly from preferring
a certain outcome to the gamble.
Such a D exhibits a poorer ability to discriminate between gambles that D considers
to be worse than the certain outcome than those gambles that are better. Thus α may
be viewed as a parameter that encapsulates D’s ability to discriminate between
gambles , with higher values of α representing a lower ability to discriminate.
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Similarly, an examination of Figure 3.4 a) or b) shows that the parameter β encap-
sulates D’s attitude to risk, β < (=) > 1 representing a risk prone (neutral) averse
D.
It is reasonable to suppose that D’s ability to discriminate between gambles is
independent of D’s disposition towards risk. Thus α and β can be treated as being
independent. With α, β > 0, it is reasonable to suppose that α[β] has a gamma
distribution with scale l[s] and shape k[r]. Choosing k = r = 2 and l = s = .5, Π(α, β)
the joint prior on α, β is of the form Π(α, β) ∝ βα exp(−2(α + β)). Consequently,
Π(αi, βi) ∝ βiαi exp(−2(αi + βi)).
Combining Π(αi, βi) with the likelihood (A.1) gives us the posterior distribution of
αi, βi, denoted Π(αi, βi|y,pi, ci), where y = (yi1, ..., yi,ni) and pi = (pi1, ..., pi,ni). The
ingredients necessary to solve Equation (4.4) are at hand, with (0,∞) as the limits of
integration. The integration has been done numerically using the bisection method.
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